A lot of attention has been given to behavioral models and their abilities to explain stylized facts in asset pricing. The recent market crashes and suspicions of gross overvaluation have also brought to the forefront worries about the impact of irrational traders. A question that arises when considering models with irrational agents is whether they can survive in the market when confronted to rational agents. In a recent paper Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2002) show that when agents have utility over terminal consumption only, they can impact prices even when their wealth share is negligeable. First, we show here that the introduction of intermediate consumption considerably alters this conclusion. Namely, irrational agents with low consumption share have a far smaller impact than in the no-intermediate consumption case. Second, we consider the impact of biased learning rules in a context of incomplete information, and study through simulation the distribution of irrational agents ' consumption shares. We find that over a reasonable horizon (50 years) under and over reaction have little impact on an agent's consumption share.
Introduction
Anticipations are at the center of economic modelling in a stochastic environment. Agents construct their anticipations on the basis of their observations and make choices such as investment, saving, consumption by comparing their current situation with the anticipated future situation, which are contingent on the realization of a random event. In the standard Lucas (1978) pure exchange economy agents have rational anticipations, in the sense that the distributional structure of the underlying stochastic variables is known by all agents. Under incomplete information, the sophisticated agents are expected to learn from their observations of the economy and construct rational beliefs about the current and possible future states of the economy. In the early work on incomplete information and asset pricing (Detemple (1986) , Genotte (1986) for continuous time, Bawa and Klein(1977) for discrete time) a representative agent is constructed, and his beliefs are updated using Bayes' law. Later, as in , multiple agents are considered and heterogeneity in beliefs is shown to have a significant impact on equilibrium quantities, such as interest rate and Sharpe ratio.
In the psychology litterature the rational construction of belief based on an optimal use of data is severely questioned. Numerous bias and anomalies have been documented at different level of the decision process. In a series of papers Kanheman and Tversky (1972, 1974, 1979 ) have put forward a number of departures from the standard expected utility behavior. The fact that cognitive bias have been reported in experimental context is an important element that should be considered when modelling agents decisions in financial markets. Inclusion of cognitive bias in single agent model include, among others, Cechetti et al. (2000) , Barberis et al. (2001) , Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) , Barberis et al. (1998) , Daniel Hirshleifer and Subramanyam (1999) . These papers show that departure from rationality may help understanding some of the empirical puzzles in asset pricing related to the equity premium and risk free interest rate.
Our concern in this paper is in the way agent process information to construct their beliefs and how this impact their survival and the market equilibrium. We consider the so called availability heuristic, when agents construct their beliefs while relying too heavily on recent data, and overconfidence when agents rely too heavily on their prior beliefs. A question that naturally arises in a multiagent context, is whether natural selection will drive biased agent to bankruptcy and if yes how fast. Researchers have provided different answers based on different assumptions. Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) present a model where some agents, the noise traders, behave randomly and interact with rational agents. Surprisingly, the noise traders, who non intentionally make very risky investments, end up dominating the market in some situations. In fact, randomly behaving agent may hold a portfolio that is closer to the log (growth optimal) portfolio, and as a result may dominate the market. In contrast, Blume and Easley (2001) demonstrate in a general equilibrium context that in a complete market finite state model, Bayesian learners eventually dominate the market when confronted to any other type of learner. In their model, as time passes, the agents who do not correctly update the state probabilities will assign zero probability to some possible event. So, they will therefore have a contingent consumption plan with zero consumption in some states with positive probability. This result is obtained under the assumption that the realization of the random states is observable, which is generally the case in a discrete time model. However, in a continuous time model with incomplete information, the true state is typically not observed, and therefore the survival of biased agents may differ. Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2002) study the price impact and survival of an irrational trader in a continuous time economy. Their model has 2 agents with the same constant relative risk aversion utility over terminal wealth. One agent has perfect knowledge of all parameters of the underlying stochastic process. The other, the irrational agent, uses parameters with a constant deviation from the true value. Then, they show that asymptotic survival of the irrational agent depends on the common risk aversion, and the value of the constant deviation. Furthermore, they show that price impact is not directly related to wealth share and that agents with small market share can have a large impact on equilibrium prices. Our approach is related to Kogan et al. (2002) , but we differ in three key aspects. First, we are interested in survival in finite time, rather than asymptotic. Indeed, if we are to assess the viability of a particular biased behavior in a financial market, studying asymptotic properties is akin to assuming hereditary transmission of the biased behavior.
In contrast, by considering finite time properties we ask the question of survival over the life cycle of an investor, which we will typically assume to be 50 years.
Second, we do not make the extreme assumption that rational agents know the true value of the parameter. We only assume that they rationally update their beliefs, i.e. they use Bayes law. We also generalize the modeling of irrational agents. Namely, in our model, they also update their beliefs, but they display over or under reaction 1 . Third, we allow for intermediate consumption, an essential aspect of most investor's situation. As a result we are able to discuss the equilibrium properties of the risk free market, which is not possible when intermediate consumption is not modeled. Kogan et al. (2002) have shown that in general, price impact is not related to an investor's wealth share. We show in our model that when agent have logarithmic utility, when intermediate consumption is allowed, this is no longer the case, and it is the consumption share which summarizes the impact of an irrational agents. In fact, when agent have logarithmic utility, the stock price is not at all affected by the presence of irrational agents, but only the risk free interest rate is. When agent care only about terminal wealth, the state price density is a function of their conditional expectation of the terminal dividend, even when they have logarithmic utility.
When intermediate consumption is introduced, the state price density for logarithmic utility depends on the current value of the dividend process and not on conditional expectations of future dividends. As a result, the stock price is unaffected by the divergence in beliefs. We also consider the price impact of irrational agents when risk aversion is greater than one. Again, it is their consumption shares which summarizes their impact on the equilibrium interest rate and the Sharpe ratio.
We develop these ideas by considering a pure exchange economy where the drift of aggregate consumption is unobserved. The economy is populated by agents with heterogeneous learning rules. Different types of biased agents, namely over and under reactive, interact simultaneously with a rational agent.
We do not assume that irrational agents behave randomly, as in the noise trader literature. Rather, we model them as expected utility maximizers whose investment and consumption decisions are optimal conditional on publicly available information. However, their expectation are taken relative to a probability measure which does not result from an optimal use of the observations. We compute the competitive equilibrium in such a model and obtain, by simulation, the distribution of average and terminal consumption shares. We find that biased behavior has a limited impact on the consumption share of an agent when the horizon is set at 50 years. In a 2 agent economy the average consumption share of a rational agent ranges from 50 to 57 % percent depending on the bias coefficient. In a 3 agent economy, starting with equal endowment, all agents remain close to 33 % of consumption share, irrelevant of their learning rule. We find however, that the standard deviation of the average consumption share across simulations is much larger for biased agents. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, discusses the structure of the economy, the agents preferences, the individual learning rules and ends with a characterization of the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the price impact and the conditions for finite time survival of irrational agents. In section 4 we look at the distribution of average consumption for different levels of under or over reaction, using simulations. We also consider the effect of irrational agents on equilibrium volatility. We conlude in section 5.
Model

The economy
We consider a pure exchange economy with finite horizon T, where the uncertainty is described by probability space (Ω, F, F, P 
where the volatility λ is a positive constant and the drift process γ t evolves according to
The initial value of the money market account is normalized to one, so in equilibrium the price process B t is given by
There are I agents in the economy endowed with initial number of shares π i0 > 0, i ∈ {1, .., I}. Units of money market account are denoted π 0 it . The flow of information available to the agents is restricted to the filtration generated by the dividend process, F D . We assume that agents have heterogeneous gaussian initial beliefs about the drift process γ t , with mean m i0 and variance ε i0 . Subjective probability measure are represented by P i . Agents preference over consumption are described by the expected utility functional
where R refers to the common relative risk aversion,
is the common discount rate and ψ is a positive constant. The dividend process is represented in the subjective probability space as a function of the innovation process χ it := 
The cum dividend stock price process in the subjective measure is given by
The quantities (µ it , σ t , r t ) are obtained endogenously in equilibrium. Trading takes place continuously and there are no frictions. The wealth process X it associated to a trading strategy, π it , takes the form
A trading strategy is admissible if X it is uniformly bounded from below by a constant (this guarantees the absence of arbitrage, see Dybvig and Huang (1988) 
Learning
We consider different types of agent: some are bayesian learners and some dis- , and the conditional variance
are given by
We can now describe how agent with learning bias update their beliefs. Note that this is not an optimal use of the observations, but simply an attempt at translating in an updating equation some of the cognitive anomalies reported in the psychology litterature. We will consider the following cases
• Agent over/under reacts to new observations
where ϑ < 1. When ϑ = 0, therer is no under/over reaction and the observed information is optimally used to update the belief. When ϑ < 0, the agent over-reacts, and when 0 < ϑ < 1 the agent under-reacts.
• Agent thinks he knows the true value of the unobserved parameter
in this case the agent never updates his initial belief.
• Under reaction with ϑ = 1, which is the extreme under reaction case where new information is ignored and the belief converges toward the long term mean β. 
Individual Optimality
Note that the economy is initially incomplete as the number of risky securities is inferior to the number of Brownian motions. However, every contingent claim adapted to F D t is attainable, and therefore when information is incomplete and restricted to F D t , the market can be treated as complete for the purpose of individual consumption and investment decisions. We therefore use the standard results of Cox and Huang (1991) to solve the static problem equivalent to the dynamic consumption investment decision. In order to present optimal consumption we define the individual specific state price density process
where
is the subjective market price of risk (MPR). Individual state price densities are linked by the expression ξ it = η it ξ 1t , where η it satisfies
and ∆ it = m 1t − m it . Notice here that
, is the change of probability measure from agent i to agent 1. The static budget set is defined as
The static optimization problem is given by
which yields the following optimal individual policies
where y i is a Lagrange multiplier which solves agent i's static budget constraint
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a combination {(c it , π it ) ; (r t , S t )} , where (c it , π it ) is an optimal admissible strategy for all i taking (r t , S t ) as given and all markets clear
In the goods market, the market clearing condition implies that all dividends are consumed. In the financial market, the market clearing conditions imply that the stock is held and the bond is in zero net supply. In order to derive the equilibrium, we choose a reference agent, which is arbitrarily called agent 1. This enables us to compute all expectations under the probability measure P
1
. The equilibrium is expressed in terms of the reference agent subjective measure.
Proposition 1 The competitive equilibrium for the economy described in this section is given by
This result is classic in the litterature (Detemple and Murthy (1996) ), and the proof is omitted.
3 Survival and price impact
Survival in finite time
Blume and Easley (2001) propose to study the question of survival of irrational agent by looking at the ratio of marginal utilities of 2 agents in the economy,
. By virtue of the Inada condition this ratio diverges to ∞ only if c it → 0 or c jt → ∞, since in their model the aggregate endowment is bounded, the ratio of the marginal utilities diverges to ∞ only when agent i disappears. Notice that the ratio of marginal utilities in our model can also be interpreted as a Radon-Nykodim derivative (or likelihood ratio) of the two subjective measures
In our model the measure of the rational agent is equivalent to the measure of the irrational agent, so in finite time, none will vanish. A similar result is stated in Blume and Easley (2001) "
..trader i survives on the set where the likelihood ratio of j's forecasts to i's forecasts remains bounded.."
In a finite state model, when an agent assigns a zero probability to a particular state, when the state is realized and observed by all agents, we will have divergence of the likelihood ratio. In our model the filtration is generated by the dividend process, and the observable states are thus possible values of D t .
If an irrational learner assigns a zero probability to a particular value of the drift γ, it does not mean that she assigns a zero probability to an observable event, since irrelevant of the beliefs about γ t the dividend process still takes its value in R + . To verify the positive consumption of an irrational agent, it suffices to look at the process η it . The ratio of marginal utilities diverges to ∞ only if η it diverges. Let us consider for example, the agent who does not incorporate new information in his filtering process and converges to the long term mean β of the unobserved process. In this situation, η 2t solves the following stochastic differential equation
This process is almost surely finite if
which for the mean reverting process γ t is verified. More generally the change of measure η 2t gives the consumption ratio relative to the rational agent. Clearly when agent 2 displays no learning bias, the process η 2t remains bounded in finite time, as eventually m 1t = m 2t as we have assumed gaussian initial beliefs.
Similar arguments demonstrate that, in finite time, none of the biases we have considered will lead an agent to disappear. A proof is given in appendix B. In general the following conditions must hold for an agent i to survive relative to
Price impact
We first discuss the case of logarithmic utility to illustrate the price impact of biased agents. From proposition 1 the stock price, in the log economy, is given
It is of interest to note here that there is no direct impact on the stock price from the presence of irrational agents in the log economy with intermediate consumption. Irrational agents do affect the economy, but only through the risk free interest rate. When agents have utility over terminal wealth only, as in Kogan et al. (2002) , the state price density depends on the conditional expectation of the terminal dividend, and as a result the stock price is affected by irrational traders' beliefs. In the present context the state price density is given by
and depends only on the current dividend and likelihood ratios, which under agent 1's probability measure are martingales. As a result, when calculating the stock price, we obtain
but as E 1 t 1 ηiv = η it , this simplifies to equation (22) . The interest rate given in proposition 1 is equal to 
And here again, the consumption share of each agent summarizes his contribution to the deviation from the full information value of the Sharpe ratio, given
by Rλ. The fact that irrational traders can only affect prices when their consumption is large enough holds also for assets with longer duration. Indeed, as the stock price pays a continuous dividend its duration will certainly be smaller than that of a long term bond. A long term bond, paying one dollar at time T, is valued as
For simplicity, we consider the 2 agent setting with logarithmic utility, where the Bayesian agent has perfect knowledge and the irrational agent deviates from a constant term. The long term bond is given then by the following expression
In an economy populated by rational traders only we would obtain
Notice here that η
2t is the relative consumption share of the irrational agent, and as such, he can only impact the long term bond price when his consumption share is sufficiently large relative to the rational agent. Figure (4 ) displays the evolution of the excess long term bond yield over time. We see again that the divergence follows the consumption share of the irrational agent.
Simulation
We study survival over finite time horizon using the following simulation methol- 
To identify a single state price density we construct the expirement based on a reference agent as we did to compute the equilibrium. To do so we use the process η it which is the ratio of state price density of agent i to the state price density of the reference agent
We can reformulate the first order condition as
With this new definition it is easy to obtain ξ 1t from the market clearing con-
We can arbitrarly choose the reference agent as it has no impact on the consumption or wealth share. The equilibrium quantities that we discuss in the next section are also obtained from this representation, and when presenting distributional result we rely on the objective probability measure by using the link between the innovation process κ 1t and the underlying brownian motion 
Simulation with logarithmic preferences
We first focus on logarithmic preferences. When agents have logarithmic preferences, they try to hold the growth optimal portfolio, so any deviation from a rational belief construction should be detrimental. With higher risk aversion levels, the optimal portfolio is no longer the growth optimal portfolio, and in this case, as shown in Kogan et al. (2002) , an irrational trader may, by mistake, hold a portfolio that his closer to the growth optimal portfolio, and as a result may accumlate wealth faster and hold a dominant position in the economy. Here, we want to assess whether an agent who irrationaly deviates from the growth optimal portfolio holds a negligeable wealth in finite time, when parameters are chosen to mimick consumption data in the US over the last century.
2 agent economy
We simulate a 2 agent economy and report average consumption shares and their standard deviation for different values of the bias coefficient in table (1).
It appears that over 50 years, biased agents, displaying over or under reaction, are not much penalized in terms of average consumption. Their average consumption share is decreasing with the size of the bias but remains close to 50 %. Even when ϑ = 1, i.e. the biased agent does not incorporate any new information, his average consumption is 43 %.
3 agent economy
In a 3 agent economy, when the Bayesian agent is confronted with two biased learners, we can also observe, in table (2) , that consumption shares are not very much affected by the biased behavior. However the standard deviation, across simulations, of the consumption shares is an order of magnitude larger for the biased agents, and increases with the level of the bias coefficient. This is even more apparent in figure (5) through (7) which display the distribution of pairs of consumption shares. The biased agents follow strategies which imply taking on non remunarated risk, and as a result the standard deviation of their consumption share increases. Over longer time horizon, the Bayesian learner clearly dominates, and average market share when the time horizon is 1000 years is over 95 percent. Again, we may wonder whether such a long horizon is suitable for studying the impact of a particular investor's behavior.
Simulation with R = 4
When agents have risk aversion coefficient different from 1, the stock price is no longer a simple linear function of the dividend, and therefore, the presence of biased agent has an impact on both interest rate and stock price. We consider in this section the survival of biased agent when risk aversion is set at R = 4. 
Trading volume and interest rate
With the logarithmic preference structure we can obtain in closed form the portfolio of each agent in the economy, and study the equilibrium trading volume.
The optimal portfolio for a log investor is given by
In equilibrium we know that the stock volatility σ, is equal to the constant dividend volatility 
When beliefs are homogeneous, ∆ it = 0 for all i, the market share of agent 1 is equal to his consumption share c1t Ct , furthermore since we are assuming identical preferences, it is a constant. Trading in this model is thus a direct consequence of divergence in beliefs. It is of interest to note that a slight divergence in beliefs generate important trading volume as illustrated in figure (11) and (12) . The sample path observed here is obtained from a 2 agent model with equal prior, agent 1 is rational bayesian and agent 2 displays under reaction. The market share of agent 1 is highly volatile, even though the divergence in beliefs is of small magnitude.
We further study the effect of heterogeneity in learning rules by looking at the distributions of average market share in 2 agent economies, when agent 1 is rational bayesian and agent 2 displays the learning bias discussed earlier.
As displayed in figure (13) , the rational agent holds a larger share of the stock against the over-reactive agent than against the under-reactive agent. The overreactive (under-reactive) agent increases (decreases) the volatility of the interest rate, making the bond market relatively less (more) attractive than the stock market since, in the log economy, there is no effect on the stock volatility due to divergence in beliefs. This effect is illustrated in figure (14) . In a single agent incomplete information model the volatility of the interest rate, given our parametrization is 1.65 % on average, in the presence of under reactive agent the average volatility decreases to 1.4 % and in the presence of over reactive agent it increases to 1.84 %. This small difference has a significant effect on the portfolio allocation of the rational agent.
Volatility
To assess the effect of the bias we consider an economy populated by 2 agents with CRRA utility with R = 1. Using the Clark -Ocone formula and the martingale representation theorem (see appendix B), we are able to obtain a quasi analytical solution for the equilibrium volatility for the under / over reactive case,
+ αdu ds
This expression depends on the value of ϑ, the bias coefficient, and to assess whether the effect is positive or negative we rely on a numerical evaluation. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a continuous time pure exchange economy populated by agent with heterogeneous learning rules. In our framework, biased learners do not necessarily vanish when paired with a bayesian learner.
This result crucially depends on the impossibility to assign a zero probability to an observable state. We have characterized the effect of a biased learner on the interest rate volatility and trading volume in an economy populated by logarithmic agent, and we have shown that market share can be sinificantly affected.
Finally we have obtained an expression for the equilibrium stock volatility for agents with constant relative risk aversion superior to one an we have, numerically, shown that the presence of biased agent can have an important impact on the volatility, positive or negative, depending on the parametrization.
As far as price impact is concerned, the introduction of intermediate consumption in the structure of the model has an important effect. An agent's effect (irrational or not) on equilibrium quantities is strongly related to his consumption share. In the case of logarithmic utility as consumption share and wealth share are identical, an irrational agent can have an impact on the Sharpe ratio only if his wealth share is large enough. As the wealth share of an irrational agent decreases in a log economy, his price impact will vanish at the exact same rate. We have considered here only time separable utility function and further research could be conducted in that direction. Also, while we allow biased agent to learn about the unobserved process, we do not let them learn about their own
mistakes. An important improvement to the present model would be to describe a learning rule which includes a bias about which the agent learns over time.
Appendix A
We show here that for the bias considered in section 2, an agent can never disappear in finite time. Technically, we want to garanty the following
almost sure sense, where P o refers to the objective probability measure.
First using the definition of the innovation process χ 1t :=
Ds − m 1s ds , the condition can be rewritten as
which is almost surely finite if and only if
from the assumption of gaussian prior beliefs and mean reverting properties of the process γ, this is immediatly verified, and thus agents do not disappear in finite time.
Appendix B
We shoe here how to obtain the equilibrium volatility. From the equilibrium stock price and first order condition, we write the stock price as
The innovation process χ 1t :=
it has a representation in term of χ 1 , namely
for some unique square integrable process φ. Applying Itô's lemma to the product ξ t S t , we identify its diffusion term and obtain
and therefore the volatility is given by
To identify the process φ we need the following lemma.
is the closure of the class of smooth random variable S with respect to the norm
Suppose that W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. Then
taking conditional expectations
Proof see Nualart (1995) page 42.
The operator D in our setting is the Malliavin derivative with respect to the one-dimensional Brownian motion χ 1 , and S is the class of smooth functionals of χ 1 . The process φ can be identified from Lemma 1
which we rewrite using the chain rule of Malliavin calculus as
Using this result we can write
Applying Itô's lemma to the product ξ t S t and equating stochastic terms yields the following equality
Explicit computation of the malliavin derivative can be found in Berrada (2003) . We obtain the following representation for the volatility
The deviation introduced by the irrational agent is captured through the mallivain derivative of the process ∆ 2t (the difference in beliefs), which evolves according to
as opposed to the usual case
We can see that even when conditional variances converges the difference in beliefs remain a stochastic process in the presence of a biased agent. We can now compare the solution for the malliavin derivatives of ∆ 2t. .In the normal case
in the presence of a biased agent
Finally we obtain for the equilibrium volatility in the normal case
and in the presence of a biased agent 
